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LITIGATION AS A MEASURE OF WELL-BEING
Theodore Eisenberg, * Sital Kalantry,** and Nick Robinson***
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, portraying much litigation as pathological is a
key component of business lobbying groups' social construction of the
legal system.1 These groups commission and use questionable social
science analysis2 and misleadingly portray highly publicized cases,
such as the McDonald's coffee-spill case. 3 They do so to help charac-
terize civil litigation as dominated by lottery-seeking plaintiffs, greedy
plaintiffs' lawyers, and state civil justice systems that are overly hostile
to business. Marc Galanter and others have refuted these myths,4 but
they persist even among well-informed observers. 5 Debunking mis-
leading litigation anecdotes is both necessary and important. The
need to defend against unwarranted attacks on litigation, however,
should not distract from studying litigation's important institutional
role in society. Notwithstanding the U.S. corporate assault on litiga-
tion, law and development scholars have long viewed increased litiga-
tion as a natural attribute of increasing prosperity.6
* Theordore Eisenberg is the Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
Statistical Sciences at Cornell University. This Article was presented as the Keynote Lecture at
the 2012 Erfurt Conference on Law and Economics.
** Sital Kalantry is the Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the International Human
Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School.
*** Nick Robinson is a Visiting Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, ME-
DIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
2. Theodore Eisenberg, The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair,
and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 970 (2009).
3. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 203-04 & tbl.6.
4. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENY. U. L. REV. 77, 90 (1993).
5. For example, President Obama stated his willingness to consider medical malpractice re-
form to rein in frivolous lawsuits. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25,
2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2011. The best documented crisis in
the medical malpractice field, however, is underclaiming by victim patients. See, e.g., FRANK A.
SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEA-
SURE OF MALPRACICE 71-73 (3d. prtg. 1995).
6. See, e.g., Christian Wollschliger, Civil Litigation and Modernization: The Work of the Mu-
nicipal Courts of Bremen, Germany, in Five Centuries, 1549-1984, 24 LAW AND SoC'y REV. 261,
261 (1990).
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This empirical study of litigation in India supplies substantial new
evidence that higher litigation rates are not necessarily evidence of an
overly litigious society or a drain on the economy; in fact, they can be
a natural consequence of economic development and improved
human well-being. As shown below, more prosperous Indian states
have, for decades, had higher litigation rates than less prosperous
states.7 And, at least in recent years, so have states with higher levels
of urbanization. We also report the first evidence that accounting for
economic and noneconomic well-being together, as measured by the
Human Development Index, seems to explain litigation rate patterns
better than explanations limited to only economic measures of well-
being, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, or only to
noneconomic measures, such as literacy rates.
Surprisingly, however, states that have prospered more do not show
increased within-state civil litigation rates in recent years. We present
evidence that India's enormous case backlog may be deterring poten-
tial litigants from filing claims. This raises the question of whether
Indian economic growth can be sustained without the well-functioning
courts that some regard as an institutional requisite to robust eco-
nomic performance and human well-being.8
Using empirical methodology to focus on both India and litigation
rates is particularly appropriate because one reason for this Sympo-
sium is to honor Professor Marc Galanter's work. His interest in In-
dia's legal system9 complements his path-breaking work on the U.S.
legal system. He has long used empirical evidence to describe legal
systems' operations and held the view that popular opinion about liti-
gation rates in the United States10 and India is misplaced. Indians
have long been branded as abnormally litigious and Galanter was an
early user of data to refute this assertion." Although comparing stud-
7. See infra Figure 4.
8. For a review of studies of the relation between law and development, see Tom Ginsburg,
Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW AND SOC'Y
REV. 829 (2000) (book review). On the need for efficient courts to promote well-being, wealth,
and justice in India, see CTR. ON PUB. LAW & JURISPRUDENCE, JINDAL GLOBAL LAW SCH.,
JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, at iv
(2010) [hereinafter JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY].
9. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA (1989); MARC GA-
LANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984); Marc
Galanter, Introduction: The Study of the Indian Legal Profession, 3 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 201,
202 (1968-1969).
10. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1097-99 (1996).
11. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor": Access to Justice and the
Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 789-91 (2003-2004).
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ies of litigation rates across countries presents challenges, India's liti-
gation rate appears to be comparatively low, 12 and may now be even
lower than it was in the nineteenth century or the first half of the
twentieth century. 13 We build and extend on this theme of Galanter's
work. By emphasizing the relation between civil litigation rates and
improved human well-being, we challenge the dogma that increasing
litigation rates should be regarded as evidence of a malfunctioning
society. 14
II. THE RELATION BETWEEN LITIGATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Thoughtful assessments of the relation between litigation rates and
economic prosperity have long hypothesized that, at least in early
stages of economic development, increasing litigation rates should be
associated with increasing economic development. 15 "Increased reli-
ance on formal law and its processes appears to parallel changes in the
complexity of a society which are produced by economic growth and
development."'16 This parallel-change observation effectively hypoth-
esizes a positive association between litigation rates and prosperity.
Professor Galanter's early work on litigation provided information
about one possible source of this association. He assembled studies to
support the claim that data "from a variety of courts suggest that
plaintiffs are predominantly business or governmental units.' 7 Eco-
nomic growth, it is reasonable to assume, manifests itself, in part, in
more businesses and more governmental activity and, presumably,
greater litigation activity by those entities. The data included studies
from Germany and Great Britain,' 8 suggesting that the association is
not unique to the United States.
12. See id. at 789-90 n.l. The litigation rates quoted in this source can be compared to those
in Table 2 of this Article. See infra Table 2.
13. Oliver Mendelsohn, The Pathology of the Indian Legal System, 15 MoD. ASIAN STuD. 823,
849 (1981).
14. Our claims are limited to civil litigation rates. Counterintuitively, high criminal litigation
rates might also be connected to improved well-being because more economically developed
societies may institutionalize the prosecution of crime more. Frequently, however, higher crimi-
nal litigation is also seemingly correlated with higher crime rates in absolute terms, which would
indicate a weakening of social well-being. Exploring these details is beyond the scope of this
Article.
15. For a review of these theories and supporting evidence, see Joel B. Grossman & Austin
Sarat, Litigation in the Federal Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 9 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 321,
321-25 (1975).
16. Id. at 323.
17. Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW AND Soc'y REv. 347, 348 (1975).
18. Id. at 356.
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Other data further support the association between economic pros-
perity and litigation. In 1998, Professor Christian Wollschliger re-
ported on civil litigation rates for thirty-five countries.1 9 Because
litigation data were not available for each country for the same year,
the data ranged from 1987 to 1996. He observed that low litigation
rates in Ethiopia, Nepal, Paraguay, and the Solomon Islands "can eas-
ily be attributed to economic underdevelopment, '20 but he provided
no statistical analysis comparing litigation rates with economic devel-
opment. Data analyzed by Professor Tonja Jacobi about U.S. states
detected a positive association between litigation rates and a strong
economy, which led her to "challenge[] the claim that litigation is a
burden on the U.S. economy that prevents its efficient operation. '21
Professor David Clark's study of regions within six countries (Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Italy, Peru, and Spain) found that "there is a
positive relationship between elevated socioeconomic development
and higher rates of civil litigation. '22 Professors Tom Ginsburg and
Glenn Hoetker found that greater economic activity was marginally
significantly associated with increased filings per capita in Japan. 23
There may be limits to this positive relation, in that it may be strong in
relatively early stages of economic development and later level off.
Data from England was offered to support this hypothesis24 and
within-country differences in economic development in Spain were as-
sociated with expected variation in litigation rates.25
Professor Galanter has noted that assertions of excessive litigious-
ness have some troubling roots in anti-Semitism. 26 But even the stere-
19. Christian Wollschliger, Exploring Global Landscapes of Litigation Rates, in SOZIOLOG IZ
nEs RiEciiTs: F-rsciHnu-r FOR ERi WR BLANKLNBUIRG 577, 582 (1998).
20. Id. at 582-83.
21. Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Variation in Litigation
Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LE-GAL SrulD. 205, 206 (2009). Data covering mid-twentieth century
U.S. states' economic growth and litigation rates did not fit the expected pattern, but the findings
are limited by having considered only the tiny fraction of U.S. litigation brought in federal
courts. See Grossman & Sarat, supra note 15, at 342. Jacobi used state court data and noted
their numerical dominance. See Jacobi, supra, at 219-20.
22. David S. Clark, Civil Litigation Trends in Europe and Latin America Since 1945: The Ad-
vantage of Intracountry Comparisons, 24 LAW AND Soc'y Ritv. 549, 557 (1990).
23. Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Ja-
pan's Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 48-51 (2006). The authors report a regression
coefficient for per capita income that was significant at the p=0.10 level, which is often described
as marginally statistically significant. They also found that within-prefecture economic declines
were associated with increased litigation. Id.
24. Grossman & Sarat, supra note 15, at 324 (citing Lawrence Friedman's analysis of data
from England).
25. Id. (citing Jose Toharia's analysis of intracountry data from Spain).
26. Marc Galanter, The Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal Remedies,
50 DEPAUL L. REv. 647, 649 (2000) ("When faking [of claims] flourished in the early years of
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otype that Jews are more likely to be plaintiffs can simply be seen to
reflect the association between economic well-being and litigation. In
2000, Galanter noted that economic reasons explained why Jewish re-
sidents of the Detroit metropolitan area in 1967 were more likely than
others to go to lawyers. 27 Economic prosperity was offered as a ra-
tional alternative explanation to not-so-thinly veiled bigotry.
Litigation rates, of course, are not merely a function of economic
activity. Different dispute resolution institutions can lead two eco-
nomically similar countries to have quite different litigation rates.2 8
Indeed, Professor Clark suggested that within-country comparisons
were more appropriate in studying varying litigation rates than cross-
country comparisons. 29 Within a country, Professors Ginsburg and
Hoetker showed that institutional changes in Japan-expansion of the
bar, procedural reform, and an increase in the number of judges-
were associated with litigation rates across Japan's prefectures. 30 Pro-
fessor Jacobi reported evidence that political factors, such as the divi-
sion of state power between political parties, are associated with
increased litigation rates. 31 We therefore include in our analysis of
litigation rates important noneconomic factors for which information
is available-noneconomic measures of well-being, urbanization, and
litigation delay.
Our study complements two prior studies of Indian litigation.
Menaka Guruswamy and Aditya Singh reported information about
India's state-level litigation rates and state-level measures of well-be-
ing.32 They studied states' case filings for one year, from July 1, 2008
to June 30, 2009, and informally compared them with state-level pov-
erty rates, literacy rates, and violence. 33 They observed a positive as-
sociation between lower poverty rates, as measured in 2004-2005, and
civil case filing rates in 2008-2009. 34 They also observed a positive
the Twentieth Century, it was often associated in the public mind with Jews." (citing KEN DORN-
STEIN, ACCIDENTALLY ON PURPOSE: THE MAKING OF A PERSONAL INJURY UNDERWORLD IN
AMERICA 60 (1996))).
27. Id. at 653 n.20 ("Silverman attributed greater Jewish involvement with the legal system to
greater wealth and social integration than to religious or ethnic reasons.").
28. Erhard Blankenburg, The Infrastructure for Avoiding Civil Litigation: Comparing Cultures
of Legal Behavior in the Netherlands and West Germany, 28 LAW AND SoC'Y Ri-v. 789, 789
(1994) (finding different litigation rates based on different institutions filtering disputes).
29. See Clark, supra note 22, at 565-66.
30. See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 23, at 49-50.
31. See Jacobi, supra note 21, at 222.
32. Menaka Guruswamy & Aditya Singh, Village Courts in India: Unconstitutional Forums
with Unjust Outcomes, 3 J. ASIAN PUB. PO'Y 281, 282 (2010).
33. Id. at 284.
34. Id. at 286.
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association between higher literacy rates, as reported in the 2001 Cen-
sus, and civil filing rates, and a similar association between Naxalite
violence 35 reported in 2008 and civil filing rates. 36 Professors Arnab
Kumar Hazra and Maja Micevska studied state-level court congestion
from 1995 to 1999 by assessing, among other factors, civil caseloads
per capita and civil caseloads per judge. 37 They found a negative asso-
ciation between these caseload measures and state GDP per capita. 38
They attributed the negative association to the fact that states with
greater resources are able to clear cases at a higher rate.39
We extend Guruswamy and Singh's findings by focusing on addi-
tional factors affecting litigation, by analyzing more years of data, and
by using statistical methods to test the likelihood of the observed rela-
tions occurring by chance. Our study differs from Hazra and Micev-
ska's work because we studied the litigation rates that focus on new
filings, whereas their caseload measures included pending cases. Ad-
ditional resources, as measured by GDP, may help process existing
cases, but need not similarly affect new case filing rates.
Part III of this Article briefly describes India's legal system. Part IV
describes our hypotheses and the data we analyze. Part V presents
results on the relation between economic and other measures of well-
being and litigation rates. Part VI discusses the results and concludes.
III. BACKGROUND OF INDIA'S LEGAL SYSTEM
India consists of twenty-eight states and seven union territories. 40
Figure 1 shows the states and territories; the shading provides a sum-
mary of the civil filing and GDP data presented in more detail in Part
V.
35. Id. Naxalite is briefly described as follows:
Today, the peasant uprising that brought the word "Naxalite" to the lips of common
people is forty years old. Naxalbari, where this peasant insurrection was born and sub-
sequently entered into the national consciousness, is still a sleepy, quiet town in north
Bengal. Although the revolution is over, and policemen are still killed either by bomb
blasts or mines, and government officials are kidnapped for heavy ransom.
Arnab Kumar Hazra & Maja B. Micevska, The Problem of Court Congestion: Evidence from
Indian Lower Courts, JUDICIAl Ri-EORMS IN INDIA: IssuiEs & AsPECIS 137, 144-45 (Arnab
Kumar Hazra & Bibek Debroy eds., 2007) [hereinafter JUDCcIAj REFORMS IN INDIA].
36. Guruswamy & Singh, supra note 32, at 287. See Jayanta Mahapatra, Comment: Letter
from India, 60 TiE HUDSON RLV. 359, 362 (2007).
37. See Hazra & Micevska, JUDICIAL REFORMS IN INDIA, supra note 35, at 144-45.
38. Id. at 152.
39. Id.
40. The territories are federally administered entities with distinctive legal features that may
relate to the assessment of civil filings. For ease of description we often refer to states and
territories collectively as states.
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FIGURE 1: CIVIL FILINGS AND GDP PER CAPITA, BY STATE,
2005-2010
~I B. GDP per capita(47,103]
(38,47]
S(33,381
(22,33]
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elh I INo data
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Note: Filings are civil filings per 1,000 persons using lower court filings averaged from 2005 to
2010. GDP is in thousands of rupees per capita averaged for that period. Filing data, GDP data,
and state abbreviations are shown in Table 2 below. Union territories of Daman and Diu, Dadra
& Nagar Haveli, and additional small Puducherry enclaves are not shown. Data not available
for Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.
Chandigi
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India's unified national court system is headed by the Supreme
Court, High Courts of states below it, and lower courts below them.41
The High Courts have supervisory power over all courts in their juris-
diction.42 The judiciary is regarded as independent of the executive
and legislature. Although the President of India has the power to ap-
point Supreme Court43 and High Court justices,44 senior Supreme
Court justices effectively nominate High Court candidates and the
President approves their nominees.45 The lower courts include the
most important courts of general jurisdiction, which include over 600
district courts, and the other subordinate courts.46 As of December
31, 2010, there were 13,962 district and subordinate court judges.47
Geographical jurisdiction for the twenty-one High Courts coincides
with state and territory boundaries, with six High Courts having au-
thority over more than one state or territory. Table 1 shows the allo-
cation of states and territories to the High Courts.
41. INDIA CONST. arts. 131-36, 227.
42. Id. arts. 135, 138.
43. Id. art. 124, § 2.
44. Id. art. 217.
45. Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court,
8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009) ("In the 1990s, the Supreme Court reinterpreted
the Constitution to hold that a small collegium of senior justices headed by the Chief Justice
would pick its own membership, and the role of the executive became more of a formality.").
46. District Courts of India, INDIAN COURTS, http://indiancourts.nic.in/districtcourt.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013). In each district, the highest court is headed by a district and sessions judge
who may deal with both criminal and civil matters. Below this is a Court of the Civil Judge
(Senior Division) for civil matters and the Chief Judicial Magistrate for criminal matters. At the
bottom of the court hierarchy is the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and the court of
the Judicial Magistrate for civil and criminal matters, respectively. See id. There are currently
600 districts in India. See List of Districts in India, DEPT. OF LAND RES., dolr.nic.in/hyperlink/
distlistnew.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
47. See Introduction, Pendency and Disposition, COURT NEWS (Supreme Court of India, New
Delhi, India), Jan.-Mar. 2011, at 2, 4 [hereinafter INDIA COURT NEWS].
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TABLE 1: INDIA HIGH COURTS GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION
Name of High Court
Andhra Pradesh
Allahabad
Bombay
Calcutta
Chhatisgarh
Delhi
Gujarat
Gauhauti
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Madras
Orissa
Patna
Punjab & Haryana
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Uttarakhand
States included
Andhra Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Maharashtra; Goa
West Bengal
Chhatisgarh
Gujarat
Assam; Nagaland; Manipur;
Meghalaya; Tripura; Mizoram;
Arunachal Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu & Kashmir
Jharkhand
Karnataka (formerly Mysore)
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Tamil Nadu
Orissa
Bihar
Punjab; Haryana
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Uttarakhand
(formerly Uttaranchal)
Note: The table shows the current allocation of states and territories to High Courts.
During the periods covered by data we use, the Himachal Pradesh High Court was
established in 1971, Sikkim became a state with its own High Court in 1975, the Gauhauti
High Court's jurisdiction was expanded to cover seven states in 1987, and Chhatisgarh,
Jharkhand, and Uttarkhand all became states with their own respective High Courts in
2000.48
IV. HYPOTHESES AND DATA
India's federal structure allows for testing hypothesized associations
between litigation rates and both economic prosperity and other fac-
tors. For a within-country study of litigation rates and prosperity, In-
dia has the useful but lamentable characteristic of substantial variation
in economic development. GDP per capita varies across states by
48. Further information regarding the histories of these High Courts can be found on their
respective websites. See History, HIGH CT. HIMACHAL PRADESH, http://hphighcourt.nic.in/hist.
htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); Historical Perspective of the Sikkim Judiciary, HIGH CT. SIKKIM,
http://www.highcourtofsikkim.nic.in/sj.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); History, GAUHAUTI
HIGH CT., http://ghconline.nic.in/history-more.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); Home, HIGH CT.
CHHAYFISGARH, http://highcourt.cg.gov.in/default.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); History,
JHARKHAND HIGH CT., http://jharkhandhighcourt.nic.in/History.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013);
About Us, HIGH CT. UTrARAKHAND, http://highcourtofuttarakhand.gov.in/pages/display/154-
about-us (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
Union territories included
Daman & Diu, Dadra &
Nagar Haveli
Andaman & Nicobar Islands
Delhi
Laksahdweep
Puducherry
(formerly Pondicherry)
Chandigarh
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nearly a factor of ten,49 compared, for example, to a variation by a
factor of roughly two in the U.S.5° We exploit this variation and simi-
lar state-level variations in other attributes, such as education and life
expectancy, to formulate and test hypotheses about their influences on
litigation rates.
A. Hypotheses
As previously described, scholars have long noted that economic
growth may create more litigation.51 More specifically, as economies
grow in size and complexity, litigation increases "both to resolve social
conflict and more simply as a mechanism of economic interaction. ''52
Like many studies,53 we therefore hypothesize that litigation rates will
be higher in Indian states that are more economically prosperous,
based on state-level measures of GDP per capita.
The association between noneconomic well-being and litigation
rates is less widely acknowledged. An impoverished, uneducated field
worker in poor health faces obstacles other than money to securing
rights: lack of education likely reduces knowledge of one's private and
public rights; ill-health may disable one from many activities, includ-
ing litigation; and shorter life expectancies provide less time to sue. In
addition to these direct effects on litigation, less education and shorter
life expectancies may compromise economic development, and
thereby indirectly influence litigation rates through economic
measures.
In countries with substantially homogenous literacy and health
rates, the influence of noneconomic well-being on within-country liti-
gation rates may be difficult to detect and has not been analyzed. In-
dia's states, much more than the Japanese prefectures studied by
Ginsburg and Hoetker or the U.S. states studied by Jacobi, vary sub-
stantially in noneconomic measures of human well-being, such as life
expectancy, education, and literacy.54 In analyzing litigation rates, we
employed a widely used measure of well-being that includes
49. See infra Table 2.
50. U.S. state GDP calculations are based on the 2009 state population table and the 2008
state GDP table. See Resident Population-July 2009, in State Rankings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ranks/rankOl.html; Gross Domes-
tic Product by State in Current Dollars, 2008, in State Rankings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 2,
2009), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ranks/rank28.html. Including the District
of Columbia increases the variation to a factor of about five.
51. See, e.g., F. Van Loon & E. Langerwerk, Socioeconomic Development and the Evolution of
Litigation Rates of Civil Courts in Belgium, 1835-1980, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 283, 285 (1990).
52. Jacobi, supra note 21, at 214.
53. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 23, at 51; Jacobi, supra note 21, at 205.
54. See infra Table 2.
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noneconomic factors-the Human Development Index (HDI). The
HDI is a multidimensional measure of well-being that combines mea-
sures of life expectancy, educational achievement, and per capita ex-
penditure.55  We speculate that litigation rates are positively
associated with higher HDI scores.
India's population density varies substantially across states. 56 In-
creased urbanization likely leads to greater business and personal in-
teractions, thereby creating more opportunities for disputes and
litigation. Interpersonal and kinship relations in urban settings may
be generally weaker, thereby also contributing to higher litigation
rates.57 Moreover, lawyers tend to be more concentrated in urban ar-
eas, thereby reducing the transaction costs of obtaining a lawyer and
thus promoting litigation. 58 Wollschliger's study of litigation rates
over time in Bremen noted that the effects of urbanization on litiga-
tion need "no comment," 59 and Ginsburg and Hoetker accounted for
large urban prefectures in assessing filings.60 Drawing similar infer-
ences, we also speculate that states with more urbanization will have
higher litigation rates.
Accounting for institutional features of a legal system is also impor-
tant in assessing litigation rates, as shown in Ginsburg and Hoetker's
study of Japan.61 The two most notable institutional features of In-
dia's judiciary are perhaps a widespread belief in the existence of sub-
stantial corruption 62 and delays due to a large backlog of cases.
India's lower court case backlog was over twenty-six million cases as
of 2008.63 We lack information to study the effect of corruption, but
have reasonable information about filed, pending, and disposed cases
55. See, e.g., Human Development Index (HDI), UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PRO-
GRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). The HDI index mea-
sures health (life expectancy), living standards (GDP per capita), and education (literacy and
years of schooling). See id.; see also JENI KLUGMAN ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, THE HDI 2010: NEW CONTROVERSIES, OLD CRITIQUES'3 (2011), available at http:/
/hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr20ll/papers/HDRP 2011_Ol.pdf. In 2010, gross national in-
come replaced GDP as the measure for living standards. KLUGMAN ET AL., supra, at 15.
56. See infra Table 2.
57. Cf. Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 23, at 44-45.
58. Cf. id. at 38-39.
59. Wollschliger, supra note 6, at 279 ("The specific effects of urbanization ... on litigation
need no detailed comments here.").
60. See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 23, at 49 tbl.3.
61. Id. at 37-42 (accounting for factors such as the expansion of the bar, law reform, and
system capacity as measured by the number of judges).
62. See JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY, supra note 8.
63. Id. at 9; Kannan Kasturi, Civil Litigation? No, Thanks., INDIA TOGETHER (July 12, 2009),
http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/jul/gov-civil.htm (noting a total case backlog of thirty million
cases).
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to account for the degree of delay across states. In the U.S., where
there is dramatically less delay in the judicial system compared to In-
dia, evidence exists that a litigant will choose between a bench or jury
trial based on the expected difference in adjudication time.64 We ex-
pect greater delay to discourage litigation and to be associated with
reduced litigation rates.
B. Data
1. Data on Litigation Rates
To assess litigation rates, we use two types of civil filings: one based
on filings in the district and subordinate courts (collectively, the lower
courts), and a second based on filings in the High Courts. The case
filing data are for civil cases filed in each state's lower courts, as re-
ported in the India Supreme Court's Court News, which is published
four times per year and contains quarterly data for the years
2005-2010.65 Court News also provided High Court civil filing data
comparable to the lower court data. For High Courts not coterminous
with a single state, we recalculated total population at the High Court
level, using the geographical coverage of the High Courts shown in
Table 1 to compute filings per capita. Data on lower court filings are
also available for 1977 from a report of the Law Commission of In-
dia. 66 We have not located conveniently available lower court civil
case filing data for years before 2005, other than for 1977.67
Lower court data have the advantage of including the mass of civil
filings and thus likely provide the most thorough measure of litigation
activity. High Courts are more removed from the mass of civil filings
and their appellate dockets exclude all the cases that never lead to
appeals. Parties may forego appealing for reasons that apply in any
country, including acceptance of the lower court's ruling as correct or,
even if the ruling is believed to be incorrect, an estimate that the
chance of success on appeal is too low to warrant the investment. In
64. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Em-
piricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1147-48 (1992) (showing that litigants tend to select shorter
trial queue in opting for judge versus jury trial).
65. Much of the filing data are also available at IndiaStat, which requires password or IP
access. See INDIASTAT, http://www.indiastat.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
66. See LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, DELAY AND ARREARS IN TRIAL COURTS 63-76 (1978).
67. Prior to 2005, the available data do not provide separate numbers for civil cases instituted
in a year. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE, GOV'T OF INDIA, STATE-WISE NUMBER OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENDENCY CASES IN DISTRICr AND SUB-ORDINATE COURTS IN INDIA
(2004). This report is also available at IndiaStat. See supra note 65.
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the U.S., for example, the vast majority of trial court outcomes are not
appealed.68
High Court data, however, have some advantages. First, only
twenty-one High Courts exist and they presumably have reasonable
information about their own case filings. Lower court data used for
this study were supplied to the High Courts from hundreds of lower
courts, which then supplied them to the Supreme Court. This process
provides less assurance of consistent reporting for lower courts.
Second, High Court filings provide a measure of what are likely the
most important cases because they are the cases that parties press to
appeal and presumably involve higher stakes. A High Court, for ex-
ample, had original jurisdiction over the case against then-Prime Min-
ister Indira Gandhi69 that led to the declaration of the State of
Emergency from June 26, 1975 to March 23, 1977, during which op-
posing political party leaders were arrested, press censorship was
used, and elections were postponed.70
Third, High Courts in India have much wider original jurisdiction
than in many other countries, including jurisdiction over revenue mat-
ters71 and jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, pro-
hibition, quo warranto, and certiorari. 72 Original jurisdiction High
Court cases can number in the tens of thousands in a year73 and com-
prised 52% of cases filed in the state of Orissa in 2009.74 Thus, many
High Court cases did not originate in the lower courts.
68. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases:
Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 663
(2004).
69. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (Allahabad High Court) (In-
dia). The Supreme Court of India stayed the ruling and later overturned the conviction of
Gandhi.
70. Cf S. P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 101 (2002). The immediate impetus of the
emergency was a High Court ruling that Indira Gandhi had committed corrupt practices during
her election campaign and was therefore disqualified from holding office for six years.
71. See INDIA CONST. art. 225. Six High Courts have original jurisdiction in civil cases involv-
ing sufficient amounts, while other High Courts have more specialized original jurisdiction. See
Arnub Kumar Hazra & Bibek Debroy, Introduction to JUDICIAL REFORMS IN INDIA, supra note
35, at 15, 17-18.
72. See INDIA CONST. art. 226, § 1.
73. See DEP'T OF ECON. & STAT., Gov'T OF TAMIL NADU, STATISTICAL HAND BOOK 2010, at
175 tbl.32.2 (2010); DIRECTORATE OF ECON. & STAT., Gov'T OF ANDHRA PRADESH, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT ANDHRA PRADESH 2001, at 343 tbl.23.1 (2002).
74. This is based on analysis of the Supreme Court's Court News publications that contain
data for 2009. See INDIA COURT NEWS, supra note 47, Jan.-Mar. 2010, at 8-10; id., Oct.-Dec.
2009, at 7-9; id., July-Sept. 2009, at 7-9; id., Apr.-June 2009, at 7-9. In 2009, 22% of the total
cases filed in India were filed in the High Court. We arrive at this ratio by dividing the number
of High Court cases decided in a year by the total number of High Court and subordinate court
cases decided in the same year.
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Fourth, High Court data provide a check on the lower court data.
A high association between lower court and High Court filings ought
to exist across the states. An appeal cannot be filed without a lower
court ruling, therefore, lower court activity imposes a fundamental
constraint on High Court activity that should promote an association.
Moreover, concerns about India's civil justice system have generated
the view that High Courts are reluctant to deny admission of
appeals. 75
Separate recent lower court civil case filing data are available for
the twenty-eight states and for the three largest union territories:
Delhi,7 6 Chandigarh, 77 and Puducherry. 7 India has four other union
territories, all substantially smaller, with an aggregate population of
about one million people, 79 less than 0.1% of India's roughly 1.2 bil-
lion people.80 These small union territories are not included in our
lower court analysis.
Our analysis of lower court and High Court filing data covering
2005-2010, discussed later, established that High Court data are a rea-
sonable proxy to assess the relation between economic prosperity and
75. See Pratap Bhanu Mehta, India's Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty, in PUBLIC INSTI-
TUTIONS IN INDIA: PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN 158, 181 (Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhan Mehta
eds., 2005) [hereinafter PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA].
76. Delhi is India's National Capital Territory. See INDIA CONST. art. 239AA, §§ 2-4. It con-
tains, by at least one measure, the largest city population in India, see India, in World Factbook,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/librarylpublications/the-world-factbook/geos
/in.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2013), and is one of the ten largest metropolitan areas in the world,
see Largest Cities of the World (By Metro Population), WORLDATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.
com/citypops.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). Its administration includes its own legislature,
High Court, and executive council of ministers headed by a chief minister. INDIA CONST. art.
239AA, §§ 2-4.
77. Chandigarh is a union territory and planned city that arose out of the partition of British
India into Pakistan and India. In the partition, the former province of Punjab was split between
Pakistan and India. The capital of the former province, Lahore, became part of Pakistan. Thus,
the newly formed entity on the Indian side needed a new capital. In addition, in 1966, the new
state of Haryana was created out of the eastern portion of India's Punjab. The surviving portion
of Punjab had a Sikh and Punjabi language majority; Haryana had a Hindu and Hindi language
majority. Chandigarh serves as the capital of two states, Punjab and Haryana, see About
Chandigarh, CHANDIGARH ADMIN., http://chandigarh.gov.in/knowchd-general.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013), and is, by Indian standards, of modest size with a population of about one million.
See OFFICE OF REGISTRAR GEN. & CENSUS COMM'R, GOV'T OF INDIA, CENSUS OF INDIA 2011:
PROVISIONAL POPULATION TOTALS 47 (2011) [hereinafter INDIA CENSUS 2011], available at
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/data-files/india/Final-PPT-201-chapter3.pdf.
78. Puducherry is a union territory that was a French colony and consists of four districts that
are not contiguous. Like Delhi, Puducherry has its own elected legislative assembly and execu-
tive council of ministers. INDIA CONST. art. 239A, § 1. Puducherry's population is larger than
Chandigarh's, but is still less than 1.5 million people. INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77.
79. The four smaller union territories are Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Dadra and Nagar
Havel, Daman and Diu, and Lakshadweep.
80. INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77.
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civil filings. We therefore extended our analysis to years for which
High Court filing data were available prior to 2005. High Court civil
filing data for the years 1964-1983 (other than 1966) are contained in
the Jaswant Singh Commission Report,81 a government study under-
taken to assess the necessity of adding High Courts or benches (loca-
tions) within High Courts. To compute High Court per capita civil
filings and GDP per capita for the earlier time period, we used the
1961 Census data for the years 1964-1965; for the years 1967-1976, we
used the 1971 Census data; and for the years 1977-1981, we used the
1981 Census data.
2. Data on Economic Well-Being
As a measure of economic well-being for the time period
2005-2010, we used state-level data for each year provided by the
Government of India through its Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Information. The data are reported as net state domestic product in
rupees at current prices, 82 which is GDP minus depreciation on capital
goods. Some suggest that net domestic product is a better measure of
growth than GDP,83 and data for it are the best conveniently available
data on economic growth that we have for the state level. We take the
liberty of referring to it as GDP because that term is so commonly
associated with measures of growth.84 For High Courts not cotermi-
nous with single states, we recalculated total GDP at the High Court
level using the geographical coverage of the High Courts shown in
Table 1. As a measure of economic well-being for the High Court
data for the period 1964-1983, we again used GDP at the state level.
81. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GOV'T OF INDIA, JASWANT SINGH COMM'N, REPORT ON THE GENERAL
QUESTION OF HAVING BENCHES OF THE HIGH COURTS AT PLACES AWAY FROM THEIR PRINCI-
PAL SEATS AND BROAD PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA TO BE FOLLOWED IN REGARD THERETO
64-66 (1985).
82. See Per Capita Net Income, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOV'T OF INDIA (Aug. 4, 2011), http://
pib.nic.in/newsite/AdvSearch.aspx (search for "per capita income" (without quotation marks),
from Aug. 1, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2011, and select Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementa-
tion from the drop-down menu; then follow "search" hyperlink; then follow "per capita income"
hyperlink) [hereinafter India Per Capita Net Income]. These net domestic product data come
from the Indian government's Central Statistics Office.
83. E.g., Roland Spant, Why Net Domestic Product Should Replace Gross Domestic Product
as a Measure of Economic Growth, INT'L PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR, Fall 2003, at 39. This source
also compares net domestic product and GDP performance for member countries of the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-Operation for Development, showing generally little difference. Id. at
42 tbl.1.
84. For India, these data have sometimes erroneously been referred to as GDP data. See List
of Indian States by GDP, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of Indian.states-by_
GDP (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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3. Data on Noneconomic Well-Being
As noted above, we used the HDI as a measure of noneconomic
well-being. We have state-level data for fewer geographical units for
the HDI than for litigation rates and GDP. Therefore, our analyses
that include the HDI encompass fewer states but still include a sub-
stantial majority of the states. The state-level HDI data used here are
for 2007-2008, come from the India Human Development Report pub-
lished in 2011, and are reported (as of this writing) to be the most
recently available state-level HDI measure. 85 We also explore the as-
sociation between litigation rates and literacy rates. We used literacy
rates from the 2011 Census.
4. Data on Urbanization
We used population density as a measure of urbanization. Density
is computed by dividing a state's population in the 2011 Census by its
square kilometers to yield the number of inhabitants per square kilo-
meter. The decennial census data from the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation provided population density
information. 86
5. Data on Court Backlogs
Our analysis of the relation between litigation rates and court
backlogs is limited to 2005-2010 and to the lower courts, where most
cases begin. Data on filed, pending, and disposed cases come from
Court News. As a measure of the backlog, for each state and for each
year, we divided the number of pending civil cases by the number of
disposed civil cases. This yielded the number of years needed to clear
the civil docket, as shown in Table 2. The number of years required to
clear the civil docket should not be confused with the average number
of years required for a case to be heard and decided by a court. Many
cases are settled or withdrawn before they are heard, but these cases
are still counted as disposals. This measure of backlog also effectively
assumes a first-in, first-out treatment of cases, with subsequently filed
cases being delayed until previously filed cases are processed. Be-
85. INST. OF APPLIED MANPOWER RESEARCH, PLANNING COMM'N, GOV'T OF INDIA, INDIA
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, at 24 tbl.2.4 (2011) [hereinafter INDIA HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 2011].
86. India Statistics, Area and Population by States, MINISTRY OF STATISTICS & PROGRAMME
IMPLEMENTATION, http://mospi.nic.inlMospi-New/site/IndiaStatistics.aspx?status=1&rnenu_
id=14 (follow "India an Overview" hyperlink; then follow "Chapter 2 AREA AND POPULA-
TION" hyperlink; then follow "TABLE 2.1 - AREA AND POPULATION BY STATES"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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cause some classes of litigation enjoy priority,87 and other factors are
undoubtedly at work, the measure is not intended as a precise indica-
tor of how long cases will remain on the docket or how many years it
would take for a case to be decided by a court. We merely used it as a
proxy for comparing delay across states. Note that the measure effec-
tively accounts for other factors that may influence case processing
time, such as the number of judges in a state's court system and the
economic resources devoted to the court system. The effect of more
judges or resources should translate into greater capacity to process
cases and therefore reduce the time needed to clear the cases from the
system.
6. Data Limitations
Two primary challenges exist in using data available on the Indian
court system. The first is the potential for lack of uniformity in re-
cordkeeping over time and across states. In data available for 1977,
for example, regular hearing and miscellaneous filings are disaggre-
gated.88 The data for 2005-2010 seem to only include regular hearing
filings, but the inclusion of miscellaneous filings by any of the state
courts would create inconsistencies in the data. 89 A state-specific con-
cern is that Tamil Nadu's filing rate is far above that of any other state,
as shown in Table 2 below, and exceeded only by the much more
densely populated and far more prosperous union territory of
Puducherry. It would not be surprising if Tamil Nadu courts account
for cases differently than other states.90
The second potential challenge is the possibility of error in record-
keeping. Most data available for different state lower and High
87. LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, supra note 66, at 37 (noting that matrimonial, eviction, Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, and India Succession Act cases should be given priority).
88. Miscellaneous filings are interlocutory appeals, requests for stay, and requests for interim
orders, which result from preexisting regular hearing filings.
89. We used the comparable filings data available for 1977. See LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, supra
note 66.
90. Some possible causes of this outlier do not fully account for the variation. The volume of
family court cases was not large enough to materially affect results. See Lok Sabha Unstarred
Question No. 6743 Family Courts, MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE, GOV'T OF INDIA (answered on
May 6, 2010), http://164.100.47.132/Annexture/lsq15/4/au6743.htm (showing less than 250,000
new family court cases per year). Nor does the number of cases disposed of by Lok Adalat
(people's court) methods seem large enough to affect the observed patterns. See Cases Disposed
off [sic] by Lok Adalat Methods, NAT'L CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMM'N, http://ncdrc.
nic.in (follow "General Information" hyperlink; then follow "Statistics" hyperlink; then follow
"Lok Adalat" hyperlink at bottom of page) (last updated Feb. 8, 2013); Lok Sabha Unstarred
Question No. 3571 Lok Adalats, MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE, Gov'T OF INDIA (answered on
Aug. 20, 2004), http://164.100.47.132/Annexture/lsq14/2/au3571.htm. For a discussion of Lok
Adalats, see Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 11.
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Courts seem to vary reasonably from year-to-year. However, there
are occasionally unexplained spikes or dips in litigation filing; we note
some of these in reporting our results.91 This may represent actual
volatility in litigation filing or may simply be a recordkeeping error.
Overall, the data on the Indian courts is reasonably uniform. Accord-
ingly, although these potential challenges should be kept in mind, they
do not seem to significantly undercut our conclusions.
Our analysis has limitations other than the consistency and accuracy
of the data. The lack of data at the district level is a concern. Al-
though many state-level empirical and policy studies in India and the
U.S. exist, state-level comparisons cannot account for within-state het-
erogeneity. State-level studies effectively treat New York City the
same as upstate New York and Mumbai the same as rural Maharash-
tra. India's substantial differences between urban and rural areas,
even within states, suggest that state-level studies necessarily oversim-
plify. The sheer size of some Indian states exacerbates this concern.
Uttar Pradesh's population of approximately 200 million people,
standing alone, would make it the fifth most populous country in the
world.92 Representing its economy and courts by using statistics for
the entire state is not fully satisfactory.
The available data also do not include useful information about sub-
categories of civil cases. Some hypothesized relations, such as the ef-
fect of the HDI on filings, likely influence different types of cases to
different degrees. Finally, data on civil filing rates are not available
for different income and social groups. For example, although India's
litigation rate overall may be low compared to a country like the
U.S.,93 the filing rate of Indians making over $30,000 annually may be
as high or higher than Americans in a comparable income bracket. To
more accurately compare whether a society is more litigious than an-
other, one should contrast the filing rates of like social groups,
whether measured by GDP per capita, HDI, or other relevant
factors.94
91. See infra note 98; see also infra Figures 9-12 and accompanying text.
92. INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77, at 46.
93. Jacobi shows a mean filing of 168,764 and a mean population of 5,034,887 for U.S. states.
See Jacobi, supra note 21, at 208. This corresponds to filings of 33.5 per 1,000 persons, far higher
than the per capita filing rate for any Indian state shown in Table 2. See infra Table 2.
94. Ideally, this study would benefit from a more precise base measure of possible litigation
events than proxies such as population or economic conditions. For example, a study of tort
litigation in Thailand used motor vehicle registrations as a proxy for possible automobile acci-
dent litigation. See DAVID M. ENGEL & JARUWAN S. ENGEL, TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA:
GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND 105-06 (2010).
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Table 2 provides summary statistics for our key variables for the
thirty-one geographical units we analyzed using lower court filings.
95
The state abbreviations in Table 2's second column are the same as
those used in the Figures. To compute 2005 filings per capita, we di-
vided the annual court filings by the state's 2001 population, which is
reported in the 2001 Indian Census 96 and contains the census informa-
tion closest in time to 2005. For the 2006-2010 filings per capita, we
divided the annual court filings by the state's 2011 population, as re-
ported in the 2011 Indian Census, 97 which contains the census infor-
mation closest in time for 2006-2010. The states' civil filings shown in
Table 2 are average filings from 2005 to 2010. The GDP per capita
and case backlog data in the table are similarly averaged. The filing
and GDP data are shown graphically in Figure 1 above. GDP
amounts are in rupees and, as of this writing, the exchange rate for
rupees is approximately fifty per U.S. dollar. As previously stated, the
backlog data show the years needed to clear a state's civil case back-
log based on the number of civil cases pending and disposed in a
year.98
95. We aggregated the case filing data across the relevant Court News issues (four per year)
for each calendar year to compute each state's case filings for the years studied. See INDIA
COURT NEWS, supra note 47, Jan.-Mar. 2011, at 7; id., Oct.-Dec. 2010, at 7; id., July-Sept. 2010,
at 7; id., Apr.-June 2010, at 7; id., Jan.-Mar. 2010, at 10; id., Oct.-Dec. 2009, at 10; id., July-Sept.
2009, at 9; id., Apr.-June 2009, at 9; id., Jan.-Mar. 2009, at 9; id., Oct.-Dec. 2008, at 9; id.,
July-Sept. 2008, at 9; id., Apr.-June 2008, at 10; id., Jan.-Mar. 2008, at 10; id., Oct.-Dec. 2007, at
9; id., July-Sept. 2007, at 10; id., Apr.-June 2007, at 8; id. Jan.-Mar. 2007, at 8; id., Oct.-Dec.
2006, at 8; id., July-Sept. 2006, at 8; id., Apr.-June 2006, at 10; id., Jan.-Mar. 2006, at 9.
96. OFFICE OF REGISTRAR GEN. & CENSUS COMM'R, GOV'T OF INDIA, CENSUS OF INDIA
2001: PROVISIONAL POPULATION TOTALS, CHAPTER 3, at 5-6 (2001) [hereinafter INDIA CENSUS
2001], available at http://censusindia.gov.in/Data-Products/Library/Provisional-PopulationTo-
tal_link/PDFLinks/chapter3.pdf.
97. INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77, at 46.
98. The backlog average shown for Mizoram in Table 2 is questionable because the 2005 data
show only twenty-three cases disposed and 834 cases pending, leading to a "years to clear" back-
log of 36.3 years for that year. Excluding 2005 leads to a "years to clear" backlog of 1.7 years.
See INDIA COURT NEWS, supra note 47, Jan.-Mar. 2006, at 9.
DEPA UL LAW Ri266
z
0
0
0
0" ,
Z
<
0Z
<
z
(-4
6i
-VIEW [Vol. 62:247
-.- . - - - q 'n
0 C
N- Nq 00 N 4 N - n N cn
N~N0O
~ - -e~o
, r 1 -4 0 wi 1.6 N r~ - N NqN* - \0 e N m C cC M r-
N O N0 00 oR wC Cl- 00 Nc a, ()0
g .6 00 ' C N i N 0
C; C N N 0 ' 0
0
0,
N
6
eCm m~ Nl C, 0 NI C, X0 00 V) - M
r- r- N 0 04 r- ' C Ln N Or 'I
W) c
Nl N-
Ci0 Cf
'c -It o N N \0 r 'T I C 0, C w W
cei 0 -; 0 0, 4 'o N- c-i vi r- vi 6 4 o6 N c6
.. 0M m4
m - .= CO) CO0
C) N UnC-4 N - ,
2013] LITIGATION AS A MEASURE OF WELL-BEING 267
'0t " 0 q r r O C e'
eqi r- Itr -r 0D - - 0~ .
rq ~ o oq N0\0r
eq *J* ,- c O
'-q -
c')
i , o 0
N N 00 '
r-: q~ -i C)
o -
kn 0U*C N'
00 O\q '0 tC ') '
')
- - ON cc - r- \ 0 00 0-
o o.)CO  C O s5C
'0 C--
C-- C')
0 ~
C-- '0
'- C- C')
,- 0 0 ,~ ~
0
C~ CO !~-
0 0
W~C C -
CC, C') 00
I C'- ~
~ 0
C') '0
'~ "~ ~
C') 0 C')
0 0
C. ,) C--
= C' t')
0
CO
CO Z CO C~
CO ~ CO 2'- CO
0 ~' 0 ' C-
go ~ ~ -~ E .~- ~
CO ~ CO -~ CO ~
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
V. RESULTS
We first report bivariate results describing the relation between liti-
gation rates and explanatory factors. We then report multivariate lin-
ear regression models99 that assess the combined influence of the
factors on litigation rates.
A. Bivariate Results
1. Litigation Rates in Lower Courts: Economic Prosperity and
Urbanization
Figure 2 shows the relation, for each Indian state or major territory,
between civil case filings per capita on the y-axis, and GDP per capita
on the x-axis. Each of the six subfigures shows the relation for one
year, beginning with 2005 in the upper left subfigure, and ending with
2010 in the lower right subfigure. The data points in the subfigures
are labeled from left to right, with state abbreviations to show which
Indian state has the indicated civil filings and GDP. For example, the
state of Bihar (BR) had the lowest GDP per capita in each year and
also had relatively low civil case filings per capita in each year.
Figure 2 shows that the relation between civil filings and GDP per
capita was reasonably stable over the six-year period-higher filing
rates were associated with higher GDP per capita. The figure also
shows that the territories of Delhi (DE), Chandigarh (CH), and
Puducherry (PU) consistently had relatively high civil filings, accom-
panied by relatively high GDP. These territories are also distinctive in
their population densities (our measure of urbanization), which are by
far the highest in India.100 Some low-population states, Arunachal
Pradesh (AR), Meghalya (ML), Mizoram (MZ), Nagaland (NL), and
Sikkim (SK), showed the greatest departures from the pattern of in-
creased civil filings being associated with increased GDP per capita.
Figure 3 shows the average civil filings per capita and GDP per cap-
ita for the six years for which we have data, but now also incorporates
population density information from Table 2. The density information
helps illuminate the distinctive features of both the territories and the
low-population states that emerge in Figure 2. Delhi, Chandigarh,
and Puducherry have by far the three highest population densities, as
well as high GDP per capita and case filing rates. Thus, these large
99. Multivariate regression is a statistical technique that quantifies the influence that each of
several predictor variables has on the outcome variable being studied. See ANDREW GELMAN &
JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVELIHIERARCHICAL MOD-
ELS 31 (3d prtg. 2007).
100. See supra Table 2.
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FIGURE 2: INDIA CIVIL FILINGS PER CAPITA & GDP PER CAPITA,
BY STATE, TRIAL LEVEL, 2005-2010
a..
5 10 25 50
State GDP per capita in rupees (000)
00 150 5 0 25 50 100 150
State GDP per capita in rupees (000)
Note. GDP data are based on fiscal years beginning April 1 and ending March 31. State abbrevi-
ations are in Table 2. The x- and y-axis scales are in logs. Sources: Per Capita Net Income, supra
note 82; INDIA CENSUS 2001, supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
union territories are distinctive as legal entities, but also have high
population densities that may be associated with high civil litigation
rates. The low-population states had low population densities, low
case filing rates, and non-distinctive GDP per capita levels. The
straight line in Figure 3 shows the predicted values from a regression
of the relation between filings and GDP. It confirms the positive asso-
ciation between the two variables. The correlation between filings
and GDP is strong, with a correlation coefficient of 0.59 (using log
transformations), which is significant at p=0.0004.101 If one excludes
101. The significance level reported in the text can be viewed as exploring the hypothesis that
there is no linear association between filings per capita and GDP per capita. By convention, the
hypothesis being tested is called the null hypothesis. See GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G.
COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 64 (8th ed. 1989). The reported significance level, which is
also often referred to as a p-value, represents the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
when it is in fact true. In this case, an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis would lead to the
mistaken conclusion that there is a linear association between filings per capita and GDP per
capita. The p-value measures the likelihood that the observed association between the two rates
is attributable to mere random sampling variation rather than to real differences. See id. at
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the small, outlier states (ML, SK, AR, and NL), the correlation coeffi-
cient is 0.76, significant at p<0.0001.
FIGURE 3: INDIA CIVIL FILINGS PER CAPITA AND GDP PER
CAPITA, BY STATE, TRIAL LEVEL, 2005-2010, SHOWING
POPULATION DENSITY
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State six year average GDP per capita in rupees (000)
Note: The circles show the data points and the circle sizes are proportional to the states' popula-
tion densities. State abbreviations are in Table 2 and appear to the left of the circles represent-
ing the state's data. The x- and y-axis scales are in logs. Sources: Per Capita Net Income, supra
note 82; INDIA CENSUS 2001, supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
Figure 4 shifts the analysis from the 2005-2010 time period and
shows the relation between 1977 lower court filings data and GDP per
capita. The correlation between filings and GDP is similar to that in
64-66. If the p-value is 0.05, for example, there is a 5% probability that the observed or larger
differences could occur by chance if in fact the null hypothesis were true. By arbitrary conven-
tion, p-values at or below the 0.05 level are described as statistically significant. See THE EvoLv-
ING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS As EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 196-97 (Stephen E.
Fienberg ed., 1989). The small p-value reported in text indicates that, for these data, one is
extremely unlikely to reject the null hypothesis by chance. That is, it is extremely unlikely that
there is no association between filings per capita and GDP per capita across India's states. The
correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1 and is a measure of the strength of linear associa-
tion between two continuous variables. RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN RE-
GRESSION wrrH APPLICATIONS 40-41 (1986).
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Figures 2 and 3, and again large and statistically significant (0.64;
p=0.001).
FIGURE 4: INDIA CIVIL FILINGS PER CAPITA AND GDP PER
CAPITA, BY STATE, TRIAL LEVEL, 1977
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Note: State abbreviations are in Table 2. The x- and y-axis scales are in logs. Sources: LAW
COMM'N OF INDIA, supra note 66; 1981 Census, Directorates of Economics & Statistics of respec-
tive state governments.
We thus have evidence that the strong filings-GDP association at
the lower court level dates back over thirty years and of a fil-
ings-urbanization association for recent years.'0 2 This information al-
lows for assessing within-state variation over time.
2. Litigation Rates in Lower Courts and Noneconomic Well-Being
As noted above, GDP measures capture only one aspect of a popu-
lation's well-being, and India has large internal differences in other
important measures of human well-being that may affect litigation
rates. Figure 5 compares two other measures, HDI and literacy rates,
with civil case filings. We used case filings in the year closest to these
102. GDP per capita and population density are also significantly positively correlated (corre-
lation coefficient=0.34), but less strongly than is civil filings with each of GDP per capita and
population density.
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available measures: 2007 for the HDI data and 2010 for the 2011 Cen-
sus-based literacy rates. As in the case of GDP, a strong, statistically
significant correlation also exists between both HDI and filings and
between literacy rates and filings. 10 3 For the twenty-one states for
which we have civil filings and HDI data, the correlation coefficient
(after log transformations) is 0.80 (p<0.0001). For those twenty-one
states, the correlation between HDI and civil filings is larger than the
correlation between GDP and civil filings (0.743; p=0.0001). For those
same twenty-one states, the correlation coefficient (after log transfor-
mation of filings only) for literacy rates is 0.70 (p=0.0005). 10 4 The pat-
terns in the figure suggest a stronger association between HDI and
filings than between literacy rates and filings. HDI's stronger associa-
tion than GDP with filings will be explored further in the regression
models below.
3. Litigation Rates in High Courts and Prosperity
As noted above, the High Court filings-GDP relation provides im-
portant potential confirmatory and supplementary information to the
lower court filings-GDP correlation. We have analyzed the relation
for each of the years 2005-2010 and summarize it in Figure 6 using the
averages for the six-year period.
Figure 6 confirms a strong association between filings and per capita
GDP. For each year and for the six-year averages, a strong and statis-
tically significant filings-GDP association exists, though the strength
of the relation depends on excluding Sikkim. The Figure also suggests
that the Sikkim High Court does not fit the overall pattern. That
court, with jurisdiction limited to the state of Sikkim has, as shown in
Table 2, a small population and services the fewest people-less than
one million-of any High Court, by a substantial margin. The
strength of association between High Court filings and GDP is similar
to the strengths of association between lower court filings and GDP,
reported above, though direct comparison is limited due to different
numbers of observations and different outliers. If one includes Sik-
kim, the correlation coefficient for High Court filings and GDP is
0.50, which is statistically significant at p=0.0032; the correlation coef-
ficient increases to 0.65, significant at p=0.0001 if one excludes Sikkim.
More importantly, Figure 6, in conjunction with the lower court
data, suggests that using High Court data to assess the filings-GDP
relation yields results similar to those using the lower court data in
103. See supra Table 2.
104. Direct comparison of the correlations is of limited value because of the different scales
and nature of the non-filing variables.
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FIGURE 5: RELATION BETWEEN CIVIL FILINGS & WELL-BEING
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Note: State abbreviations are in Table 2. The x- and y-axis scales are in logs. Sources: Per Capita
Net Income, supra note 82; INDIA CENSUS 2001, supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note
77; INDIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
Figures 1, 3, and 4. We exploited Figure 6's evidence that High Court
data are useful proxies for the relation between the mass of filings and
economic well-being by using the 1964-1983 High Court data to assess
this connection over a longer period of time. To conserve space, Fig-
ure 7 reports the filings per capita-GDP relation for four years,
spaced five years apart: 1967 (Figure 7.A), 1972 (Figure 7.B), 1977
(Figure 7.C), and 1982 (Figure 7.D). The y-axes are filings per 1,000
persons and the x-axes are GDP per capita in current year rupees.
The data confirm the pattern for the 2005-2010 data. A strong, sta-
tistically significant association between filings per capita and GDP
per capita persists throughout the years. The pattern is less visible in
Figure 7.A because in 1967 the Delhi High Court's jurisdiction in-
cluded the area that later became the State of Himachal Pradesh in
1971. The Delhi High Court area's relative leap in prosperity from
1967 to 1972 (shown by comparing the x-axes values for Delhi in
Figures 7.A and 7.B) is likely due to the carving out of the relatively
poorer Himachal Pradesh area as a state with its own High Court.
Himachal Pradesh's ("HP" in Figures 7.B, 7.C, and 7.D) lower pros-
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FIGURE 6: HIGH COURT CIVIL FILINGS PER CAPITA AND GDP PER
CAPITA: SIX-YEAR AVERAGES, 2005-2010
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Note: The x- and y-axis scales are in logs. Sources: Per Capita Net Income, supra note 82; INDIA
CENSUS 2001, supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
perity can be seen in the 1972, 1977, and 1982 data. Thus, Delhi
proper was likely the most prosperous High Court geographical area,
even in 1967. This effect is confirmed by inspection of figures (not
shown here) for the years prior to and after 1972. In each year for
which we have data, Delhi's prosperity relative to other High Court
areas is similar to that in 1967 for 1970 and earlier years, and similar to
that in 1972 for 1973 and later years. 10 5  Carving out Himachal
Pradesh was a milestone event in terms of the Delhi High Court area's
relative prosperity.
Gauhauti is a persistently low-filing High Court in Figure 7.
Gauhauti has jurisdiction over India's seven northeastern states, all of
which have small populations, except for Assam.10 6 Yet, Figure 6
shows that in recent years Gauhauti's relation between filings and ec-
onomic well-being is consistent with the general pattern of other High
Courts. The area covered by the Gauhauti High Court moved from
105. The year of the Himachal Pradesh High Court's creation, 1971, was a transitional year
that we did not explore.
106. See supra Tables 1, 2.
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FIGURE 7: HIGH COURT CIVIL FILINGS PER 1,000 PERSONS AND
GDP, FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS
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Note: BO=Bombay, HP=Himachal Pradesh, MP=Madhya Pradesh, PJ-HR=Punjab & Haryana.
GDP amounts are based on fiscal years beginning April 1 and ending March 31. Himachal
Pradesh High Court was established in 1971. Sikkim became a state in 1975. GDP data for
Sikkim for 1976-1977 were missing in the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) source. The x-
and y-axis scales are in logs. Sources: Per Capita Net Income, supra note 82; INDIA CENSUS 2001,
supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011,
supra note 85.
low filings per capita in the 1980s, to a filings rate consistent with the
mainstream by the 2005-2010 period. 10 7 By 1972, its GDP per capita
was greater than or not materially different from that of several other
High Court areas, a pattern that persists in the most recent time pe-
riod.'0 8 Gauhauti may be a within-state instance of improved relative
economic well-being over time leading to increased and more main-
stream relative civil filings rates.
Delhi, India's National Capital Territory, has a persistently high
outlying High Court filing rate in Figure 7. In his six-country study,
Professor Clark noted that high development is associated with a
country's capital region. 0 9 His data showed that the countries' capital
107. But in 1969, its civil filings rate exceeded that of the Orissa and Patna (Bihar) High Court
areas. See supra Tables 1, 2.
108. See supra Figure 6.
109. See Clark, supra note 22, at 557; see also Figures 6, 7.
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regions showed higher litigation rates than did other areas.110 The
Delhi High Court data are consistent with his predictions about a
country's capital region.
Delhi's relative filing rates in the lower courts11 are not subject to
this straightforward explanation. Our data show that filing rates in
Delhi's lower courts have been lower than those of several other
courts, such as Chandigarh and Goa, both of which are more prosper-
ous than Delhi.112 When Chandigarh and Goa are grouped with other
areas for purposes of High Court jurisdiction (Punjab & Haryana and
Bombay, respectively), their economic prosperity relative to Delhi is
diluted; they fall below Delhi in prosperity and, at the High Court
level, Delhi's High Court filing rate exceeds their rates.113
Economic prosperity, however, as measured by GDP per capita,
can be only a partial explanation for Delhi's varying rank in filings
across High Courts and lower courts. 114 Nevertheless, several areas
that are less prosperous than Delhi (Himachal Pradesh, Kerala,
Puducherry, and Tamil Nadu) have higher civil filing rates in lower
courts. Kerala's higher filing rate may be a function of its well-being
exceeding that of Delhi based on the HDI, or based on non-GDP
measures of economic prosperity.1 15 Kerala has by far the highest life
expectancy and lowest infant mortality of states for which the data are
reported.11 6 And consumer household expenditures in Kerala exceed
those of other major states."t 7 At the High Court level, Himachal
Pradesh's filing rate exceeds Delhi's in recent years even though its
GDP per capita is less than half that of Delhi.118 Note, however, that
by the HDI well-being measure, Himachal Pradesh is not as far be-
hind Delhi as by the GDP measure. 1 9 By at least one measure of
110. See Clark, supra note 22, at 559-61.
111. See supra Table 2, Figures 6, 7.
112. See supra Figure 3.
113. See supra Figure 6.
114. See supra Figure 3.
115. See supra Figure 5, Table 2.
116. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 67.
117. See NAT'L SAMPLE SURVEY OFFICE, GOV'T OF INDIA, LEVEL AND PATTERN OF CON-
SUMER EXPENDITURE 2009-2010, at 22-23 (2011) (showing Kerala ranking first in rural con-
sumer expenditures and second to Goa in urban consumer expenditures); see also NAT'L
SAMPLE SURVEY ORG., GOV'T OF INDIA, HOUSEHOLD CONSUMER EXPENDITURE IN INDIA,
2007-2008, at 13 (2010) (showing Kerala ranking first of major states in rural and urban con-
sumer expenditures). Kerala's stronger performance as measured by household expenditures
may relate to its high percentage of households receiving inflows from remittances outside of
India. See DEVESH KAPUR, DIASPORA, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMOCRACY: THE DOMESTIC IM-
PACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM INDIA 115-19 (2010).
118. See supra Table 2.
119. See supra Table 2, Figure 5.
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poverty, Himachal Pradesh's poverty rate is about two-thirds of
Delhi's. 120
4. Within-State Changes in Litigation Rates and Prosperity
Parts V.A.1 and V.A.3 show cross-sectional associations between
civil filings and prosperity across states. A natural, further question is
whether filings and prosperity move in the same direction within a
state over time. If filings and GDP growth were to move in opposite
directions within a state, the possibility exists that the interstate fil-
ings-GDP association is an artifact of unobserved factors that vary
across states, which are simply correlated with the factor we observe,
GDP. Within a state, movement in the same direction cannot be at-
tributable to unobserved factors that differ across states because the
state being analyzed is held constant. Analyzing within-state change
accounts for unobserved factors in a state that do not vary over time.
The 1977 and 2010 lower court state-level filings and GDP data allow
us to observe the association between changes in civil filing rates and
changes in economic prosperity for two widely separated points in
time within India's states. If the association between filings and pros-
perity exists, states with increased GDP should show increased filings,
and those states with greater change in GDP between the two years
should show greater increases in filings per capita.
Figure 8 shows India's nominal GDP growth over time.121 Notwith-
standing substantial inflation, real growth has been impressive. The
rapid increase is usually attributed to economic reforms of the 1990s,
which included liberalized trade and a reduction in the size of the pub-
lic sector. 122 In the GDP measures used in this subpart, we adjusted
rupees so that higher GDP values represent real, not nominal in-
creases.123 Analysis of change over time should also account for the
120. Guruswamy & Singh, supra note 32, at 285 tbl.1.
121. Growth consistent with Figure 8 emerges in the figures above by, for example, comparing
the x-axis scales in Figures 6 and 7. Both use nominal rupees and the high end of Figure 6, which
covers 2005-2010, requires a value of about 80,000 rupees per capita for the x-axis. The high end
of Figure 7.C, which covers 1977, requires a value of between 1,400 and 1,900 rupees per capita,
with most states concentrated below 1,000 rupees.
122. See, e.g., Devesh Kapur, Explaining Democratic Durability and Economic Performance:
The Role of India's Institutions, in PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA, supra note 75, at 29; Ashok
Kotwal et al., Economic Liberalization and Indian Economic Growth: What's the Evidence?, 49
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1152, 1194 (2011) ("The sustained growth that we have seen since the
mid-1990s would clearly not have been possible without the liberalizing reforms of 1991.").
Kotwal and his colleagues also stated that "some aspects of the earlier economic regime played a
positive role in the pattern of development later." Id.
123. To adjust for inflation, we used the year-to-year changes in the December wholesale
price index available in a report entitled Month-Wise Variation in Inflation Annual Rate in India
(1981-2011). These data are available at IndiaStat, see supra note 65.
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fact that the Census was conducted once every ten years. For exam-
ple, using the 1981 Census to account for states' 1977 populations
overstates their populations and therefore understates 1977 per capita
filings. Similarly, using the 2011 Census for 2010 populations slightly
understates 2010 per capita filings. In this Subpart, we used linear
interpolation to estimate 1977 and 2010 populations, which were then
used to compute per capita filings and GDP. We similarly adjusted
1977 GDP because the data we used in the cross-section analyses were
1980 GDP per capita.
FIGURE 8: INDIA'S GDP, 1950-2010
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Sources: Central Statistical Organization, India Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementa-
tion, Gov't. of India ("CSO"), Nat'l Accounts Statistics Back Series 1950-1951 to 1999-2000
(2007); CSO, Nat'l Accounts Statistics 2011; CSO, Nat'l Accounts Statistics 2012.
For each state, we computed the difference in filings per capita by
subtracting the 1977 filings per capita from the 2010 filings per capita.
Real GDP growth over time varies across states. By using GDP at the
state level and using within-state change in its growth over time, we
can partly control for varying state growth rates. We therefore com-
puted each state's change in GDP by subtracting the state's GDP in
inflation-adjusted 1980 rupees 124 from the state's GDP in 2010. Figure
124. The 1977 state-level GDP we used was reported in 1980 rupees.
.1 .1 .2 .3 .5 .8 1.5p -- e a g -
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9 shows the outcome. A sharp drop in the reported number of Delhi's
lower court filings from 2009 to 2010 led us to report two values for
Delhi, one based on 2010 filings, the same end point year used for all
other states, and one based on 2009 filings (with an accompanying
shift to 2009 GDP data). The 2009 values are labeled "DE (2009)" in
Figures 9 and 10 below.
FIGURE 9: THE CHANGE IN CIVIL FILINGS AS A FUNCTION OF
CHANGE IN GDP, BY STATE, 1977-2010
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Note: The figure shows the difference in filings per capita in lower courts from 1977 to 2010 as a
function of the difference in GDP per capita for the same two years. Some states lacked data for
both years and are not included. Filings per capita are shown on the y-axis using a variance-
reducing square root transformation. For the three states with a filing decrease, the square root
of the absolute value of the decrease was taken and then the sign restored to its negative status.
Two data points are reported for Delhi due to the dramatic decline in filings reported from 2009
to 2010. Sources: Per Capita Net Income, supra note 82; INDIA CENSUS 2001, supra note 96;
INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
Figure 9 shows two interesting results. First, all states show in-
creased real GDP per capita (all x-axis values are positive) and all but
three states, Bihar, Delhi (using 2010 data), and West Bengal, show
increased filings per capita. A strong tendency therefore exists for
GDP and filings to move in the same direction within a state. Second,
the flow of the data points from lower left to upper right shows that
the size of the filing increase within a state is associated with the size
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of the GDP increase in the state. States with larger GDP per capita
growth had larger filing per capita increases. The state with the larg-
est filing decrease, Bihar, had the smallest GDP increase. In a regres-
sion model of the change in filings per capita as a function of the
change in GDP per capita, the coefficient for the change in GDP per
capita is large and statistically significant. 125 The line shown in Figure
9 is the predicted line from a regression model. Comparing 1977 with
recent years, other than 2010, did not produce materially different
results.
Does the within-state association between filing changes and GDP
changes exist over a time period shorter than the thirty-three years
between 1977 and 2010? To explore this, we repeated the within-state
change analysis in Figure 9, but replaced 1977 with the earliest recent
year for which we have data, 2005, and computed filing and GDP dif-
ferences between that year and 2010.
Figure 10 presents the results, which differ strikingly from those in
Figure 9. Real economic growth persists in all states; all of the real
GDP differences on the x-axis are positive. But the changes in filings
differ. Eleven of thirty states for which we have data for both years
(all those falling below the horizontal "0" line in the figure) show re-
duced filings per capita in 2010 compared to 2005. Several others
show no material increase. Our data allow us to compute the differ-
ences in filings within states for 146 state-year observations from 2005
to 2010, seventy-one of which showed a decline in filings in the subse-
quent year. So, despite broad economic growth, about half of the pos-
sible state-year observations showed declining civil filings per capita.
In an analysis not shown here, the same pattern exists for High Court
cases from 2005 to 2010.126 Figure 8 shows that the period 2005-2010
was one of substantial GDP growth for India. Large GDP growth was
125. Heteroskedasticity (nonconstant variance of subpopulations in a data set) was apparent
in a scatterplot of the change in filings per capita as a function of the change in GDP per capita.
The presence of heteroskedasticity can invalidate the assumption of homogeneous variance un-
derlying regression analysis. See MYERS, supra note 101, at 168-69. We therefore employed
weighted least squares regression, see id., with weighting based on the difference in GDP per
capita (log). Because the dependent variable benefitted from a square root transformation and
had two negative values, we added a small constant to each observation to assure only positive
values before the transformation. The regression model uses the 2010 Delhi data.
126. See sources cited supra note 95. Interestingly, there is substantial growth in Supreme
Court civil filings during this same period (2005-2010). According to Annual Statements of the
Supreme Court of India, in 2005, 22,117 civil cases were filed in the Supreme Court (if counted
as the total number of civil special leave petitions (SLP), appeal, and writ petitions filed as
admission matters in 2005); that number rose to 32,603 in 2010. However, this increase in filing
in the Supreme Court likely has little to do with an increase in prosperity during this time period.
Instead, this marked increase is more likely a sign that litigants increasingly view appeal to the
Supreme Court favorably for other reasons. This may be because Supreme Court precedent is
[Vol. 62:247
2013] LITIGATION AS A MEASURE OF WELL-BEING 281
not accompanied by filings growth within many states. Thus, an asso-
ciation between GDP growth and filings growth had a reasonable op-
portunity to emerge, yet did not.
FIGURE 10: CHANGE IN CIVIL FILINGS AS A FUNCTION
IN GDP, BY STATE, 2005-2010
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Note: The figure shows the change in filings per capita in lower courts from 2005 to 2010 as a
function of the change in GDP per capita for the same years. For states with a filing decrease,
the square root of the absolute value of the decrease was taken and then the sign restored to its
negative status. Due to Mizoram's implausibly low filings reported in 2005, the figure uses the
2006 to 2010 differences for that state. Two data points are reported for Delhi due to the dra-
matic decline in filings reported from 2009 to 2010. Sources: Per Capita Net Income, supra note
82; INDIA CENSUS 2001, supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN DE-
VELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
Some of the more extreme changes from 2005 to 2010 may be arti-
facts of the particular years used. Kerala's large filing decrease in Fig-
ure 10 is sensitive to the choice of year because 2005 was a year of
extraordinarily high reported filings for it compared to any subse-
quent year.127 This spike may lead to an overstatement of Kerala's
2005 filing rate and of the decline from 2005 to 2010. As already
noted, Delhi's filings also fluctuated substantially in the 2005-2010 pe-
becoming less clear, making appeal a more successful strategy, or because appeal is becoming a
more favored tactic for delay.
127. Filings in 2005 were at least 69% higher than in any subsequent year. See infra Figure 10.
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riod. Mizoram's filings in 2005 were reported to be twenty-five, com-
pared to 2,369 in 2010, and substantial variation also exists for
Arunachal Pradesh. So the most extreme data points in Figure 10 are
likely also the most questionable. The overall pattern, however, is not
one of systematic increase. The sloping line in the figure is the line
predicted by a regression model of filings change as a function of
GDP change. The slope is nearly flat, statistically insignificant, and, if
anything, shows a negative association between GDP change and fil-
ings change.
5. Filings Rates and the Case Backlog
Growing concern exists in India that people forego using the courts
because of the large backlog of cases, 128 which the Supreme Court has
issued orders to address. 129 It is thus possible that the absence of
within-state association between changes in filing rates and changes in
GDP in recent years could be associated with India's case backlog.
That backlog has increased substantially over recent decades. In 1977,
the ratio of pending lower court civil cases to filings was 1.48; by 2010
it had grown to 1.88, an increase of 27%.130 The interstate associa-
tions using lower court and High Court data, and the within-state
changes, as measured by the 2010 and 1977 differences, suggest that
changes in GDP do influence filings. But that process may break
down in a court system that processes cases insufficiently. Individuals,
in greater numbers, may have responded to the expected delay by de-
clining to file cases in the early twenty-first century. The absence of
association in Figure 10 may be evidence of that process. We there-
fore analyzed in more detail the relation between filings and case
backlog.
Figure 11 shows the relation between states' civil filings per capita
and their civil case backlogs for each state for each year from 2005 to
2010. The data flow from upper left to lower right, suggesting that
increasing backlog is associated with decreasing filings. The trend is
highly statistically significant, with a correlation coefficient of -0.43
128. See Hazra & Debroy, supra note 71, at 17; see also Hazra & Micevska, supra note 35, at
149; Kasturi, supra note 63.
129. See, e.g., Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2012 S.C. 642 (Allahabad High Court)
(India).
130. These clearance rates were calculated by dividing the number of civil pendency cases in
1977 (1,369,752) by the number of civil cases disposed in that year (923,978), and then doing the
same for 2010 (7,813,193 by 4,148,609). The 2010 numbers come from High Court News (2010).
The 1977 numbers are from the seventy-seventh Law Commission Report, which came out in
1978. LAw COMM'N OF INDIA, supra note 66.
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and a significance level of p=0.004.131 In recent years, therefore, the
individual state-year observations show a strong negative association
between backlog and filings.
FIGURE 11: RELATION BETWEEN LOWER COURT CIVIL FILINGS
AND CIVIL CASE BACKLOG, 2005-2010
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Note: The figure shows civil filings per capita in lower courts from 2005 to 2010 as a function of
the backlog for the same years. The relation is shown for each state for each year. Due to
Mizoram's implausibly low filings reported in 2005, the figure includes data for Mizoram only for
the years 2006-2010. The x-axis scale is in logs. Source: Per Capita Net Income, supra note 82;
INDIA CENSUS 2001, supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77; INDIA HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 2011, supra note 85.
As in the case of the filings-GDP relation, a natural, further inquiry
is the relation between filings and backlog within states over time. If
the negative association between filings and backlog suggested by Fig-
ure 11 persists within states, those states with increased backlogs over
time should show decreased filings over time. Figure 12 shows the
filing change-backlog change relation in the same manner that Figure
10 shows the filing change-GDP change relation. Figure 12, unlike
131. This significance level is based on a regression with filings as the dependent variable,
backlog as the explanatory variable, and standard errors clustered by state. If the estimate of the
coefficient of an explanatory variable is more than two standard errors away from zero, it is
referred to as statistically significant. GELMAN & HILL, supra note 99, at 42. Two standard
errors correspond to a p-value of 0.05.
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Figure 10, shows a noticeable association. In other words, increasing
backlogs are associated with decreasing filings.
FIGURE 12: CHANGE IN CIVIL FILINGS AS A FUNCTION OF CHANGE
IN BACKLOG, BY STATE, 2005-2010
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Note: The figure shows the change in filings per capita in lower courts from 2005 to 2010 as a
function of the change in the backlog for the same years. For states with a filing or backlog
decrease, the square root of the absolute value of the decrease was taken and then the sign
restored to its negative status. Due to Mizoram's implausibly low filings reported in 2005, the
figure uses the 2006 to 2010 differences for that state. The lines in the figure are predicted values
from regressions that account for outliers as described in the text. Sources: INDIA CENSUS 2001,
supra note 96; INDIA CENSUS 2011, supra note 77.
The lines in Figure 12 represent the predicted values from three re-
gression models. The uppermost line shows the predicted change in
filings if Kerala (KL), an outlier with respect to the change in filings, is
excluded. The shortest line, barely distinct from the longer line adja-
cent to it, shows the predicted change in filings if Arunachal Pradesh
(AR), an outlier with respect to backlog reduction, is excluded. The
remaining line includes all states. The significance of the relation var-
ies depending on the treatment of outliers, but it is consistently signifi-
cant at the p<0.10 or 0.05 levels. 132 The figure shows that the relation
132. In a regression model with robust standard errors that includes all thirty states in the
figure, the significance of the filings change-backlog change association is p=0.029. If one ex-
cludes Kerala and Arunachal Pradesh, the significance level is p=0.065. If one excludes only
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is consistently negative regardless of outlier treatment. Comparing
Figure 12's noticeable trend with Figure 10's absence of relation sug-
gests that backlog variation has recently had a greater influence on
filing change than has GDP variation.
B. Regression Results
Part V.A assessed influences on filings separately from one another
and suggested associations between filings and each of the following:
(1) GDP; (2) population density; (3) the HDI; and (4) case backlog.
In recent years, however, change in GDP had no association with
change in filings, as shown in Figure 10. To further assess the relations
between civil filings and the other factors, we employed regression
models in which the rate of civil filings per capita is the dependent
variable. Preliminary inspection of the data, as suggested by several
of our figures,133 indicated that transformations of variables were
needed, 134 so the models use logarithmic transforms for continuous
variables other than the HDI. The explanatory variables are GDP per
capita (log); population density (log); the HDI; and the backlog, mea-
sured as years to clear (log). We added to the models dummy vari-
ables for the years 2006-2010, with 2005 serving as the reference
category. These dummy variables help account for unobserved char-
acteristics in each year. Because we observed the same geographic
units-states-repeatedly over time, we cluster the standard errors by
state. Table 3 reports the regression results. The regression results
both confirm and illuminate the bivariate results in Part IV.A. We
discuss each of the major effects separately.
Kerala, the significance level is p=0.012. If one excludes only Arunachal Pradesh, the signifi-
cance level is greater than p=0.166. By including only Kerala but not Arunachal Pradesh is the
significance level greater than 0.10. In a robust regression model that automatically assigns less
weight to outlying values but includes all of them, the significance level is p=0.098.
133. Note that in all figures in which the volume of filings (in contrast to the change in filings
over time within a state) is represented on the y-axis, the filings are reported in logs.
134. See, e.g., SANFORD WEISBERG, APPLIED LINEAR REGRESSION 148-50 (3d ed. 2005); The-
odore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive and Compen-
satory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
175, 179-81 (2006).
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TABLE 3: REGRESSION MODELS OF CIVIL LITIGATION
FILING RATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable = civil filings per 1,000 persons (log)
HDI 6.085" 4.156" 3.478"
(1.079) (0.704) (0.756)
Population density (log) 0.320' -0.288' -0.166' -0.271" 0.401" -0.130 -0.017
(0.141) (0.098) (0.087) (0.077) (0.114) (0.090) (0.097)
State GDP per capita (log) 0.957' 1.345' 0.594" 0.600* 0.421' 0.992'
(0.306) (0.228) (0.205) (0.232) (0.173) (0.193)
2006 dummy 0.006 -0.093# -0.230' -0.154* -0.222' -0.175" -0.241"
(0.169) (0.052) (0.057) (0.061) (0.078) (0.052) (0.049)
2007 dummy -0.151 -0.128' -0.490' -0.294' -0.218 -0.237' -0.384'
(0.209) (0.045) (0.078) (0.079) (0.132) (0.073) (0.071)
2008 dummy -0.261 -0.072 -0.623' -0.319' -0.177 -0.219' -0.444'
(0.220) (0.048) (0.109) (0.102) (0.163) (0.104) (0.103)
2009 dummy -0.399 -0.108 -0.818' -0.424" -0.293 -0.282+ -0.572'
(0.261) (0.077) (0.153) (0.145) (0.175) (0.129) (0.121)
2010 dummy -0.326 -0.079 -0.958' -0.471' -0.335 -0.331* -0.695'
(0.320) (0.054) (0.151) (0.149) (0.199) (0.140) (0.135)
Backlog (years to clear (log)) -0.902" -0.596' -0.711"
(0.177) (0.152) (0.145)
Constant -10.90' -0.194 -11.40' -5.306' -7.056' -3.684' -8.277'
(2.800) (0.404) (2.114) (1.757) (2.166) (1.456) (1.814)
Observations 181 128 128 128 181 128 128
R-squared 0.411 0.662 0.582 0.709 0.597 0.795 0.709
Note: HDI=Human Development Index. The table reports ordinary least squares regression models
with state-years from 2005 to 2010 as observations. The reference category for year dummy variables
is 2005. Data are missing for Goa for 2005, 2006, for Nagaland for 2010, for Tamil Nadu for 2009, and
for West Bengal for 2007. Standard errors clustered on state are in parentheses. * p<0.01, ' p<0.05,
p<0.1.
1. The GDP and Backlog Effects
Focusing first on model (1), the coefficient for GDP per capita is
substantial and statistically significant. So, while accounting for popu-
lation density, GDP is positively associated with filings per capita.
This association persists in model (5), the only other model reported
that used the full set of state-years. Model (5) differs from model (1)
only in that it adds the backlog as an explanatory variable. The GDP
coefficient remains significant in all other models as well, which are
included to account for the effect of the HDI and backlog. The back-
log's large and statistically significant coefficients in models (5) to (7)
confirm the filings-backlog association suggested by Figure 11.
2. The GDP-Backlog Relation
The backlog's significance persists in models that include GDP as
an explanatory variable. This suggests that the backlog's effect on fil-
ings is not solely due to GDP influencing the backlog through GDP's
direct effect on filings, which increases the backlog. If it were, the
backlog-filings association should not persist when GDP per capita is
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accounted for simultaneously with backlog. The association between
GDP and the backlog would introduce substantial multicollinearity
into the model, which would deflate the importance of one or both
variables. 135 Yet both variables remain statistically significant and a
test of multicollinearity shows it not to be a substantial concern. 136 In
recent years, the case backlog's effect is increasing in importance over
GDP's effect, as suggested by comparing the relations between
changes in each to changes in filings, illustrated in Figures 10 and 12.
Furthermore, in regression models (not reported here) of the within-
state change in filings per capita from 2005 to 2010 as a function of the
changes in GDP per capita and changes in case backlog for that pe-
riod, we found some evidence of a negative association between filings
change and backlog change and no evidence of a positive association
between filings change and GDP change. In recent years, changing
backlog, more than changing GDP, has driven within-state changes in
filings.
3. The HDI Effect
Figure 5 suggests that noneconomic well-being, as represented by
life expectancy and education included in the HDI, is associated with
litigation rates. We therefore included the HDI as an explanatory va-
riable in three regression models: (2), (4), and (6). Because the HDI
is not available for several states, fewer observations are available for
those models than for models (1), (3), and (5).137 Note, however, that
the states excluded for want of HDI data are uniformly small, with a
total population of about sixteen million people, which constitutes less
than 2% of India's population.
Model (2) is the same as model (1) except that the HDI replaces
GDP per capita as an explanatory variable. To assure a common sam-
ple of states for purposes of comparing the effects of the HDI and
GDP, model (3) repeats model (1), but limits the sample to those
states included in model (2). So models (2) and (3) use the same sam-
135. There is some evidence of reduced significance among the variables. The coefficient for
GDP is much smaller in model (5) than in model (1). And, in a model not reported here, the
coefficient on backlog is larger in absolute value (-1.06) in a model that is the same as model (1)
except with backlog replacing GDP. Thus, both GDP and backlog are of reduced influence
when appearing in models together rather than separately-they are nontrivially correlated.
136. The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for model (5) is 1.62, suggesting no substan-
tial presence of multicollinearity. See ALAN C. ACOCK, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA
263 (3d ed. 2010). GDP has a VIF of 1.56, suggesting that 1/1.56, or 64% of the variance in GDP
is available after adjusting for the other predictors. Id. Backlog has a VIF of 1.15, suggesting
that multicollinearity is even less of a concern with respect to it.
137. See supra Table 2.
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pie of states and differ only in that model (2) uses the HDI and model
(3) uses GDP per capita. As measured by the proportion of the vari-
ance in the dependent variable explained by the model (the r-squared
row in Table 3), model (2) fits the data substantially better than model
(3).138 Model (4), again using the reduced sample, includes both the
HDI and GDP, and both variables remain statistically significant. The
model with both variables fits the data better than the models with
only one of them (models (2) and (3)), with another improvement in
fitting the data as measured by the proportion of variance explained.
Multicollinearity is a greater concern here because the HDI includes
an express economic component, which should correlate with GDP.
A test of multicollinearity, however, suggests that it is not a substan-
tial concern. 139 Thus, while GDP per capita is an important factor in
explaining litigation rates, noneconomic well-being also has a substan-
tial role to play. If one had to choose between the HDI and GDP, the
HDI produces superior models. 140 In models not reported here, the
HDI outperforms literacy when they are included in models sepa-
rately and the coefficient on literacy is not significant when they are
included in models together.
4. The Population Density Effect
The population density coefficient varies across models. It is posi-
tive and significant in models (1) and (5), which include the states that
lack HDI information. It is negative, however, in the models that ex-
clude those states and is statistically significant in some of those mod-
els but not in others. This variability is likely because the states
lacking HDI information include many with the most extreme popula-
tion densities. The six least densely populated states lack HDI infor-
mation. 141 Chandigarh and Puducherry lack HDI information and are
138. Another way to compare models using the same data, the same dependent variable, but
differing explanatory variables is the root mean squared error, which measures how far a
model's predicted values differ on average from observed values. The root mean squared error
in model (3) is 0.56 compared to 0.50 in model (2) and 0.47 in model (4). Therefore, the models
that include the HDI outperform the models without this measure as well. The Akaike informa-
tion criterion also indicates that models that include the HDI fit the data better than those
without it.
139. The average VIF for explanatory variables in this model is 2.13, with GDP having a VIF
of 3.18. Note that the size of the GDP coefficient in model (4) is smaller than its size in model
(3), suggesting that some of GDP's explanatory power is absorbed in the HDI. Similarly, the
size of the HDI coefficient is smaller in model (4) than in model (2). Nor is multicollinearity a
substantial concern in model (6), with an average VIF of 2.14.
140. In a model using standardized coefficients, the HDI coefficient is 54% larger than the
GDP coefficient. For information about a factor analysis that includes the HDI and GDP, see
infra note 151.
141. See supra Table 2.
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two of the three most densely populated areas. So, including the HDI
as an explanatory variable substantially reduces the variation in popu-
lation density across states in the models. Because population density
is significant when the full sample of states is available (in the models
that do not include the HDI), population density cannot be ruled out
as a significant influence on litigation rates, notwithstanding its insig-
nificance in models (6) and (7) and its marginal significance in model
(3).
One concern about regression models that include the backlog as an
explanatory variable is the presence of endogeneity, or reciprocal cau-
sation,142 which makes ordinary least squares regression results ques-
tionable. 143 The backlog may influence civil filings, but the volume of
past filings and the past backlog clearly influence the backlog. To ad-
dress this concern, we explored simultaneous equations models that
simultaneously model civil filings and the backlog and allow the num-
ber of filings in a prior year to influence the backlog.1 44 The results do
not materially differ from those reported here.
145
VI. CONCLUSION
The positive association between civil litigation and well-being
should be reasonably interpreted. It does not imply that filing more
lawsuits will increase societal well-being. 146  Causation almost cer-
tainly runs in the opposite direction, with increased well-being leading
to more lawsuits. The positive association is consistent with the law
and development theorists' view that the modernization of a country
increases reliance on formal institutions. It is also consistent with the
142. JUDITH D. SINGER & JOHN B. WILLETT, APPLIED LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS:
MODELING CHANGE AND EVENT OCCURRENCE 177 (2003). Ginsburg & Hoetker address an
endogeneity issue in their Japan study, with their primary concern being that the number of
lawyers and judges was not exogenous to the amount of litigation. See Ginsburg & Hoetker,
supra note 23, at 46 tbl.2. Hazra & Micevska address this issue with respect to backlogs in India.
See Hazra & Micevska, supra note 35, at 151 tbl.7.3.
143. See, e.g., STATACORP LP, STATA BASE REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 12, at 1659
(2011.).
144. The structural equations in those models are the same as those in Table 3. The equation
modeling the backlog uses one-year-lagged filings and the one-year-lagged backlog as explana-
tory variables.
145. Serial correlation in the dependent variable does exist and we have run autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity models, commonly known as ARCH models, as a further check.
They yield results consistent with those in Table 3. In models with random effects for states, the
coefficients for HDI and backlog remain highly statistically significant and the coefficient for
GDP per capita is marginally significant. For an effort to address similar correlation in backlog
models, see Hazra & Micevska, supra note 35, at 150-52.
146. At the individual level, however, the outcome of a lawsuit may increase personal well-
being.
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overlapping account that states with higher GDPs have more transac-
tions per capita. Thus, even if the litigation rate per transaction is
constant over time, there will be more disputes per capita and there-
fore more lawsuits per capita. 147
An economic boom could conceivably decrease filing because pros-
perity may lead to more "forgiving behavior," given that the costs of
going to court may be higher than simply just engaging in other eco-
nomic activity.148 Our results suggest that the factors underlying in-
creased litigation rates outweigh this potential effect. Alternatively,
times of economic decline might also be associated with increasing
litigation rates.149 For example, a declining economy is associated
with more debt collection and bankruptcy filings, 150 which might
dwarf the negative effect of economic decline on filings. Given the
consistent economic growth in India shown in Figure 8, we cannot as-
sess how a declining economy may impact litigation rates in India.
To our knowledge, the influence of noneconomic well-being on liti-
gation rates has not heretofore been assessed. The fact that higher
litigation rates are associated with Indian states with higher HDI indi-
ces suggests that people are more likely to use the courts to resolve
disputes when they are economically, socially, and physically better
off. Higher GDP is also correlated with higher litigation rates, but
less so than the HDI.
The HDI's explanatory superiority is likely due to it having an eco-
nomic component, income per capita, and a noneconomic component,
including education level and life expectancy. 151 Our findings may
suggest that part of the increase in litigation rates in higher HDI states
147. See Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Effects of Liberalization on Litigation: Notes
Toward a Theory in the Context of Japan, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 303, 304 (2009).
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22, at 564; Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 23, at 51 (report-
ing that Japanese prefecture level filings increased when prefectural income declined from the
prior year).
150. Van Loon & Langerwerk, supra note 51, at 285.
151. The HDI outperforms models in which its use as an explanatory variable is replaced by
both GDP per capita and literacy rates. In models that include both the HDI and literacy rates
as explanatory variables, the coefficient for literacy rates is insignificant. We have also explored
models that include state-level poverty rates, which are also significantly correlated with litiga-
tion rates. Models using the HDI outperform those using poverty rates in its place. In models
that include both the HDI and poverty rates as explanatory variables, the coefficient for literacy
rates is insignificant. In models that included the HDI, literacy rates, and poverty rates, mul-
ticoUinearity leads to unreliable coefficient estimates. We used the poverty rates reported in the
study by Guruswamy and Singh. See Guruswamy & Singh, supra note 32, at 285 tbl.1. Factor
analysis (principal factor) suggests that only one principal factor is at work among these explana-
tory variables, with a much less important second factor also at work. The HDI loads most
strongly on the first factor and the poverty rate loads most strongly on the second factor.
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is driven by individuals with increased education or life expectancy.
These individuals may file claims in personal disputes or small com-
mercial disputes. The implications for those who are concerned about
the fact that many Indians lack access to justice and courts is that sim-
ply improving the courts or macroeconomic growth are not the most
important factors in ensuring that people have access to the courts.
Indeed, guaranteeing access to justice, which includes providing indi-
viduals with a realistic chance to vindicate rights through litigation,
may require governments to ensure economic opportunity and social
rights to individuals. GDP growth alone does not assure all individu-
als a realistic opportunity to vindicate their rights.
Another, somewhat surprising result is that filings in recent years do
not increase with increasing prosperity. 152 The leveling-off theory re-
ferred to in Part II might be considered as a source of this result. If
India has reached a plateau, however, its filings are leveling off at
levels well below filings in more prosperous countries. Despite India's
impressive recent growth, its overall prosperity remains at modest
levels with respect to basic measures such as GDP per capita and the
HDI. One mechanism for the plateau being reached also seems ab-
sent. Sarat and Grossman argued that as society becomes more devel-
oped, courts become specialized so that the generalist courts lack the
expertise to resolve disputes. Although India has some recent move-
ment in the area of specialized dispute resolution tribunals, that move-
ment is likely insufficient to explain the severing of the relation
between economic growth and litigation growth.153
A more likely explanation for the absence of association between
GDP change and filing change in recent years is a high and increasing
case backlog.154 Increased backlog was significantly associated with
reduced filings per capita. This finding resonates with qualitative be-
liefs about the backlog's effect, and also with an earlier effort to quan-
tify the effect.1 55 This explanation also has intuitive appeal. Figure 11
and Table 2 show that backlogs in many states exceed two years, even
assuming no new filings, and the 1977 data establish that backlogs
have increased over time in relation to filings. It would not be surpris-
ing if, at some point, potential litigants turn away from courts for dis-
pute resolution as a result. India may have reached that point.
India's challenge is not that too many cases are filed, but that too
few are timely adjudicated. Its litigation rate, by world standards, is
152. See supra Figure 10.
153. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Table 3, Figures 11, 12.
155. See Kasturi, supra note 63.
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not high. The judiciary, though in increasing demand as the country
prospers, could threaten India's prosperity if it cannot accommodate
demands for its services. India may thus provide a test of theories that
a well-functioning court system is critical to economic growth. 156 Its
lower court system continues to be regarded as dysfunctional and we
provide evidence that the backlogs now discourage use of the
courts.157 It should be noted that the backlogs may be caused not
principally by slow case processing by judges, but by the fact that
there may not be enough courts allotted or because of the large num-
ber of judicial vacancies that currently exist. In addition to the in-
creasing backlog in Indian courts, other factors that have not been
tested in this Article could also account for decreasing litigation rates,
such as corruption, which, among other problems, leads to a lack of
predictability in the system. Additionally, many judges, especially in
the lower courts, lack proper infrastructure and instruments, such as
computers or typewriters, to undertake their work. Despite this, the
country has undergone substantial growth. Whether that growth can
continue will yield important information about the need for a well-
functioning judiciary to promote well-being.
India's civil filings story has implications beyond its borders. The
anti-litigation movement in the U.S. and elsewhere is built in part on
characterizing litigation as evidence of social malfunction. Evidence
from India and elsewhere that increased litigation often accompanies
improved human well-being should be considered when evaluating
the social implications of the amount of litigation.
156. See, e.g., Hazra & Debroy, supra note 71, at 30; TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUP-
TION REPORT 2007, at xxi-xxii (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007) ("[A] corrupt
judiciary.., diminishes trade, economic growth and human development .... ").
157. It has been noted that extreme delays provide incentives to bring invalid claims as well as
disincentives to bring valid claims. Carl Baar, Delays in the Administration of Justice, in JUDI-
CIAL REFORMS IN INDIA, supra note 35, at 119, 124.
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